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Change is an enduring feature of the economy and the labour market, even in normal 
times. The importance of adjusting to change, and of policies that promote adjustment, has been a 
recurring theme throughout David Dodge’s distinguished career. This paper deals with “displaced 
workers,” those who permanently lose their jobs because of changing economic circumstances. I 
examine what we know about displacement and its consequences, and assess policies designed to 
assist workers adversely affected by economic change. 
A central finding of research on displacement is that long tenure displaced workers -- 
those who have held their jobs for an extended period of time -- suffer much more from losing 
their jobs than do others. Canada’s Employment Insurance does not take into account this salient 
feature of the consequences of job loss. The paper discusses ways of addressing this deficiency in 
our primary social insurance program for job losers.     
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Executive Summary 
Change is an enduring feature of the economy and the labour market, even in normal 
times. Some firms expand their operations, while others contract or go out of business. 
New firms enter existing industries, and entirely new industries emerge. In recent years, 
structural changes due to technological change, globalization, and the shifting world 
economic environment have received much attention. But there is nothing new about the 
importance of changing economic circumstances. 
 
Change creates new opportunities but destroys old ones. Adjustment to change can be 
painful for those adversely affected. This paper deals with “displaced workers,” those 
who permanently lose their jobs because of changing economic circumstances. I 
examine what we know about permanent job loss and its consequences, and assess the 
rationale for and consequences of policies designed to assist workers who have been 
adversely affected by economic change. Particular attention is paid to the Canadian 
experience and to older displaced workers, a group that is likely to grow in importance 
as the population and workforce age. 
 
Canada’s economy performed reasonably well in the postwar period, achieving high 
rates of employment growth and advances in living standards. A key contributor to this 
good performance has been a dynamic labour market that shifts workers into sectors 
where they are needed and out of declining sectors without lengthy intervening periods 
of unemployment. Canadians as a whole benefit from this reallocation process of 
adjusting to changing circumstances and opportunities. However, the costs of 
adjustment are unevenly distributed in the population.  
 
Despite the importance of displacement and its consequences, it is a subject that is 
significantly under-researched in Canada. The main reason for this is the limited data 
that are available on the extent and consequences of permanent job loss.  
 
A central finding of empirical research on displacement is that some workers suffer 
much more from losing their jobs than do others. Those who have held their jobs for an 
extended period of time experience substantial earnings losses, while those who have 
been employed for relatively brief periods of time experience small losses. Long-tenure 
displaced workers experience earnings losses due to reduced income during the period 
of unemployment following displacement and because many become re-employed at 
significantly lower wages than they received in their pre-displacement jobs. Our existing 
social insurance programs, particularly Employment Insurance, do not take into account 
these salient features of the consequences of job loss.      
 
The paper concludes with a set of modest proposals for Canada. They are intended to 
address both the research and knowledge gaps relating to displacement and its 
consequences, as well as the policy gaps in addressing this important problem. To 
address the gaps in research and knowledge, Canada should follow the United States 
and carry out a regular Displaced Worker Survey—for example, one undertaken every 
other year and covering permanent job loss that occurred during the previous three 
years. This survey could be a supplement to the monthly Labour Force Survey and,   3 
therefore, need not be expensive. The U.S. experience with a regular Displaced Worker 
Survey clearly indicates its value in providing timely information on the incidence of 
permanent job loss, the duration of unemployment following displacement, and the 
consequences for individuals and their families of such events. The U.S. survey has also 
been an important source of data for research on the causes and consequences of 
permanent job loss. In a country like Canada, with significant exposure to external and 
internal economic shocks, the case for such a survey seems to be obvious. Indeed, it is 
shocking that we do not devote sufficient public resources to gathering information on 
the extent and consequences of permanent job loss, especially since the costs of doing 
so would be relatively modest.  
 
There is also a strong case for enhanced EI benefits for long-tenure displaced workers 
and, more generally, a case for altering the parameters of the EI program to recognize 
that such workers suffer much more from job loss than do other unemployed workers. I 
would follow the recommendation of the Expert Panel on Older Workers and restrict the 
receipt or magnitude of these enhanced benefits to long-tenure displaced workers with 
little or no previous EI receipt. These enhanced benefits should also be designed to 
minimize any adverse effects on the duration and intensity of job search. For similar 
reasons, the benefits and support measures provided under EI, Part II should focus 
more on long-tenure displaced workers—especially relatively intensive interventions 
such as retraining and mobility assistance.   
 
Finally, since most loss from displacement occurs after re-employment, wage insurance 
seems promising. Canada should carefully assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
such a policy. The best way to do so would be to carry out a rigorous demonstration 
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Introduction 
Change is an enduring feature of the economy and the labour market, even in normal times. Some 
firms expand their operations, while others contract or go out of business. New firms enter 
existing industries, and whole new industries emerge. About one-half of all new employer-
employee matches end within the first year, and about one-fifth of all workers have been with 
their employer for less than one year (Farber 1999).  Gross flows of labour are huge in 
comparison with net changes in stocks. In countries like Canada and the U.S., roughly 10% of all 
jobs are destroyed each year, and another one in ten existing jobs were created within the 
previous year (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999; Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger 1992). In recent 
years structural changes due to technological change, globalization, and the shifting world 
economic environment have received much  attention. But there is nothing new about the 
importance of changing economic circumstances. 
 
Change creates new opportunities but destroys old ones. It is, in the words of Schumpeter (1942), 
a process of “creative destruction.” The economic opportunities available to some individuals are 
enhanced, while those available to others are reduced. Adjustment to change can be painful for 
those adversely affected. This paper deals with “displaced workers,” those who permanently lose 
their jobs because of changing economic circumstances. I examine what we know about 
permanent job loss and its consequences, and assess the rationale  for and consequences of 
policies designed to assist workers adversely affected by economic change. Particular attention is 
paid to the Canadian experience and to older displaced workers, a group that is likely to grow in 
importance as the population and workforce ages. Some of my analysis draws on my recent 
experience as a member of the Expert Panel on Older Workers, which submitted its report to the 
federal government last year (Expert Panel on Older Workers 2008). 
   
Adjusting to change typically involves shifting labour and other resources from declining to 
expanding sectors, which thereby  contributes to economic prosperity. There are costs and 
benefits associated with adjustment, but in general the net benefits are positive, and often 
substantial in size. One has only to imagine what Canada’s standard of living would be if most of 
the labour force were still employed in agriculture, as was the case in the early 1900s. High and 
persistent unemployment experienced by a number of European countries during the past several   5 
decades are a more recent reminder of the important contribution that the labour reallocation 
process makes to economic performance. However, although the net benefits of adjusting to 
change are typically positive, a salient fact is that the costs and benefits are unevenly distributed 
in the population. Most technological and economic change results in a small number of losers, 
who each lose a great deal, and a large number of winners, who each enjoy modest benefits. This 
central feature of economic change makes labour market adjustment one of the most challenging 
problems that societies face. A variety of policies have been advocated or adopted to help meet 
this challenge.   
 
The importance of adjusting to change, and of policies that promote adjustment, has been a 
recurring theme throughout David Dodge’s distinguished career. In the early 1980s he directed 
the federal government Task Force on Labour Market Development that addressed Canada’s 
labour market challenges following the tumultuous decade of the 1970s. A central theme of the 
Task Force report “Labour Market Development in the 1980s” (the “Dodge Report”) was the 
ability of the country’s labour force and labour market institutions to adjust to changing 
circumstances (Employment and Immigration Canada 1981). More recently, as Governor of the 
Bank of Canada, David frequently wrote and spoke about the significance of adjustment in a 
country like Canada with its vast size, diverse regions, and dependence on international trade.    
  
1. The Case for Labour Adjustment Policies 
Adjustment assistance policies can promote both economic efficiency and the pursuit of equity 
goals. Because adjustment involves shifting resources from less valued to more highly valued 
uses, it promotes economic efficiency and therefore higher living standards. Market mechanisms 
will encourage responding to change, but numerous factors may impede adjustment, resulting in 
slower responses than are socially optimal (Gunderson 1986). Well designed adjustment 
assistance policies can reduce these obstacles and encourage responses that are closer to the 
social ideal.  
 
A related efficiency rationale arises from market failures in private insurance markets due to such 
factors as adverse selection and moral hazard. Because of these pervasive phenomena, private 
insurance markets generally do not offer insurance against the full range of risks associated with   6 
economic and technological change. The absence of private markets for unemployment insurance 
is a prominent example, one that is often cited as the principal rationale for publicly provided 
insurance against the income loss associated with unemployment (Green and Riddell 1993).    
 
Equity considerations also loom large in adjustment policy because, as discussed in more detail 
subsequently, economic change can cause considerable harm to some individuals and families. It 
is generally viewed as equitable to assist those adversely affected, particularly when the shocks 
were unanticipated, when they result in significant declines in income or wealth, and when 
hedging against the shocks would have been difficult. A general theme resulting from economic 
analysis is that adjustment assistance should focus on workers rather than firms or their 
shareholders (Riddell 1986). 
 
Possibly the strongest rationale for adjustment assistance policies is that, in their absence, 
political pressures would result in policies – such as subsidies to declining industries, bailouts of 
firms threatened with bankruptcy, and protectionist measures – that inhibit adjustment and harm 
society as a whole. The source of these pressures is easily identified. The benefits of responding 
to change are widely distributed, whereas the costs of adapting to change are typically 
concentrated among a small number of employees and firms. Although the total benefits to 
society of adjusting to economic shocks often exceeds the total costs, the individuals adversely 
affected form an effective lobby group and may exert considerable influence through the political 
process. Their influence arises in part because that they are easy to organize (being concentrated 
in a specific sector and often a few regions), are threatened with substantial losses, and are 
willing to devote considerable resources to fighting the source of change. In contrast, those that 
stand to benefit are typically dispersed, difficult to organize, and not willing to devote significant 
time and money to fighting for the adjustment, given the modest gains to each individual. For 
these reasons, the types of policies adopted are often diametrically opposed to those that would 
be recommended on the basis of social efficiency and equity considerations (Trebilcock 1985).            
 
2. Job Displacement and its Consequences  
 
A great deal is now known about the consequences of job displacement. Much of the research 
literature deals with “displaced workers” – those who (i) have not been discharged for cause, (ii)   7 
have permanently separated from their previous employer, and (iii) had strong prior attachment to 
the industry of their previous employer. In what follows I use this definition of displaced 
workers. I summarize the current state of knowledge about the incidence of job loss due to 
displacement, earnings losses from displacement, and other consequences such as those to health, 
families and inter-generational effects. The United States carries out a regular Displaced Worker 
Survey, which has been an important source of information about the extent and consequences of 
permanent job loss. Unfortunately, Canada does not do so, and the Canadian evidence is thus 
much more limited. 
 
A recent study by Morissette, Zhang and Frenette (2007) provides information on the incidence 
of permanent job loss in Canada during the period 1988-2002. They use administrative data 
based on tax records from Statistics Canada’s longitudinal worker file. Permanent layoff rates for 
men range from 6% to 7% in boom years to 9% in the recession of 1990-92. Comparable rates 
for females are much lower – 3% to 4% in good times and 5% to 6% in downturns. Annual rates 
of displacement due to mass layoffs or firm closure range from 1.1% to 2.4% for males and 0.6% 
to 1.1% for female workers. These data indicate that permanent job loss affects a small, but non-
trivial, proportion of the workforce in any given year. However, because it is a phenomenon that 
continues through both strong and weak economic conditions, the cumulative magnitude over 
longer periods such as a decade is substantial.  
 
The magnitudes of earnings losses due to displacement have been extensively investigated. Key 
findings include: (i) average earnings losses can be substantial, (ii) losses are greatest for long 
tenure employees, and (iii) losses persist for much longer than for other unemployed workers.   
 
An influential study by Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) analysed the consequences of 
displacement among workers in Pennsylvania. Their study has several key advantages: detailed 
administrative data linking workers and firms, several years of pre-displacement and post-
displacement earnings, and, of particular importance, a comparison group of non-displaced 
workers. They focus on workers with 6 or more years of tenure with the previous employer. 
Relative to the comparison group of non-displaced workers, earnings losses were very large: 24% 
of expected earnings even 6 years after displacement. The time pattern of earnings losses has   8 
some striking features. Not surprisingly, average earnings drop precipitously – by about 50% -- 
upon displacement. During the next two to three years, earnings recover to an important extent, 
prior to levelling off. A salient feature is that average earnings plateau at a level substantially 
below their pre-displacement level, and even further below the average earnings of the 
comparison group of non-displaced workers. There is little evidence in their data that earnings of 
displaced workers will ever return to their pre-displacement level or to the earnings levels 
experienced by their non-displaced counterparts. They also find that the earnings losses of 
displaced workers (relative to those who do not become displaced) began about 3 years prior to 
separation, suggesting that the events that lead to workers’ separations cause their earnings to 
depart from their normal levels even prior to separation.  
 
Farber (2005) analyses U.S. data from over 20 years of Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS) 
covering the period 1981-2003. In the most recent period, 35% of displaced workers are not 
reemployed three years later, while about 13% of full-time job losers are reemployed part-time. 
Full-time job losers reemployed in full-time jobs earn 17% less than their earnings without 
displacement. The average earnings loss increases dramatically with prior job tenure. 
 
The more limited Canadian evidence yields results similar to those reported for the United States. 
Morissette, Zhang, and Frenette (2007) focus on displaced workers aged 25-49 with at least 5 
years of job tenure. They find substantial and long-lasting earnings losses from firm closures and 
mass layoffs. As in the Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) Pennsylvania study, earnings start 
to decline before displacement. As expected, there is a sharp decline in earnings at displacement. 
A particularly noteworthy finding, similar to that observed in the Jacobsen, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993) study, is the modest subsequent earnings recovery. Five years after displacement, 




These and other studies of displaced workers may understate earnings losses. One reason for 
possible understatement is that most studies compare earnings prior to displacement to earnings 
in the new job among those who obtain reemployment within the period covered by the data. 
However, those who are not reemployed by the survey date may do even worse than their   9 
counterparts who obtain a new job. In addition, most studies compare post-displacement to pre-
displacement earnings. However, as noted in both the Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) 
and Morissette, Zhang and Frenette (2007) studies, pre-displacement earnings may underestimate 
“normal earnings.” In particular, the event that leads to displacement shows up in declining 
earnings up to three years prior to displacement. 
 
At the same time, earnings losses may be overstated if downsizing firms selectively lay off the 
least productive employees (Gibbons and Katz 1991). This type of “layoffs and lemons” 
behaviour does not, however, apply to plant shutdowns, and is unlikely to apply to mass layoffs. 
Both are important sources of displacement. 
 
What explains the large earnings losses that persist for many years after permanent job loss? A 
common explanation involves loss of firm-specific or industry-specific human capital. Evidence 
supporting this view includes studies by Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Neal (1995) 
that find that those who change industries after job loss suffer much greater losses. Another 
explanation is the presence of internal labour markets and wage profiles that depend on seniority. 
For a variety of reasons, employers and employees may prefer wage structures such that workers 
earn less than their value to the firm early in their career and more than their value to the firm 
later in their career. This type of behaviour produces a wage profile that increases with tenure 
with the firm, indeed one that increases with seniority more rapidly than does worker 
productivity. Employees with substantial tenure that permanently lose their jobs thus lose this 
“premium” (wages in excess of productivity) when they re-enter the job market and become 
reemployed at ages that more closely reflect their productivity.  An additional factor is that some 
displaced workers may have been earning “economic rents” and cannot be expected, on average, 
to be able to find new jobs that also pay wages in excess of worker productivity. For example, 
Kuhn and Sweetman (1998) find that earnings losses are larger for workers who lose jobs in the 
union sector and become reemployed in the non-union sector, compared to those who make a 
transition from the non-union to union sector or who remain in the union sector.   
 
The pattern of earnings losses with prior job tenure accords well with explanations built on loss 
of employer-specific and/or industry-specific human capital as well as those based on internal   10 
labour markets with seniority-based wage profiles. For example, Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan 
(2005) analyse the earnings of displaced workers in Washington State according to three 
categories of prior job tenure: 6 to 11 quarters, 12 to 23 quarters, and six or more years. Prior to 
displacement, the high seniority category (6 or more years) earned approximately double that of 
the low seniority category, and about 50% more than the middle seniority group (12 to 23 
quarters). After displacement the average earnings of the three groups are almost identical. This 
common earnings pattern persists for four years after job loss, with the result that the group with 
most prior job tenure has suffered the largest earnings losses, and the group with the least prior 
job tenure the smallest earnings losses.       
 
Although age and previous job tenure are related, age also appears to play an independent role in 
the magnitudes of earnings losses. In particular, older displaced workers are less likely to become 
reemployed  within the time period covered by the data. For example, recent Canadian data 
indicate that the proportions of male displaced workers that are reemployed within 5 years of job 
loss are 83% for men aged 25-44 but only 64% for men aged 45-59 (Expert Panel on Older 
Workers 2008). 
  
Permanent job loss has additional negative consequences, which are only briefly noted here 
despite their economic and social significance. A recent U.S. study by Sullivan and von Wachter 
(2008) concludes that displacement leads to a 15%-20% increase in death rates, equivalent to a 
reduction in life expectancy of about 1.5 years for someone displaced at age 40. There are also 
adverse consequences for the families of displaced workers. Parental job loss reduces the 
likelihood that teen-aged children will pursue post-secondary education (Coelli 2005). Children 
whose fathers were displaced have, as adults, lower annual earnings (about 9%) and have higher 
incidence of employment insurance (EI) and social assistance receipt (Oreopoulos, Page, and 
Huff Stevens 2008).  
 
In summary, the research on the consequences of displacement yields a number of salient and 
consistent findings: 
•  Earnings losses from permanent job loss are very large, especially for long tenure 
workers   11 
•  A major part of the earnings loss arises not from post-displacement unemployment, 
but from reemployment at wages substantially below their pre-displacement levels 
•  These substantial losses appear to be long-lasting (perhaps permanent) in nature 
•  Losses are similar in magnitude to other catastrophic events – e.g. having one’s house 
burn down (LaLonde 2007) 
In contrast, most unemployed workers become reemployed relatively quickly and do not suffer 
permanent earnings losses.   
 
These findings have important policy implications. As noted previously, private insurance 
markets for losses associated with displacement do not exist. In Canada, publicly provided 
insurance (EI Part I) does not provide adequate insurance against the risk of permanent job loss. 
In particular, EI does not take into account the fact that earnings losses are much larger for long 
tenure displaced workers. EI benefits depend only on employment in 12 months prior to 
displacement, so the EI program treats job losers with long tenure and short tenure in an 
equivalent fashion. Furthermore, EI only covers a portion of the lost income during the 
unemployment spell, whereas a substantial portion of the earnings loss suffered by long tenure 
displaced workers is associated with permanently lower earnings in subsequent jobs. In many 
ways, the current EI program is similar to having auto insurance that pays the same amount for 
“fender benders” as for vehicles that are totalled. 
 
3. Policies to Deal with Displacement 
A variety of policies to deal with displacement and its consequences have been proposed or 
implemented. I briefly discuss these here under two main headings: (i) ex ante (preventative) 
policies and (ii) ex post adjustment assistance policies. 
 
Policies that promote education and skill development may, in addition to their well-known 
benefits in other dimensions, also enhance the adaptability of the workforce to changing 
circumstances. A variety of evidence from both case studies and more broadly-based empirical 
research suggests that education improves the ability of individuals to adjust to changing 
circumstances (Schultz 1975). In the context of displacement, education is a strong predictor of 
the probability of reemployment after job loss. Displaced workers with more education have   12 
higher probabilities of reemployment and are more likely to be reemployed full-time (Farber 
2005). Furthermore, this relationship appears to reflect underlying causal forces rather than 
simply being a correlation between education and reemployment rates: Riddell and Song (2007) 
conclude that education has a causal impact on reemployment. This recent evidence is consistent 
with the view that investments in skills can enhance adaptability.  
 
Ex ante policies that focus more directly on workforce adjustments include those that restrict a 
firm’s ability to lay off workers or that require advance notice of layoffs and/or severance pay. In 
Canada, such restrictions arise from both the common law and from employment standards 
legislation in the federal and provincial jurisdictions (Kuhn 2000).  According to the common 
law, most labour contracts can be discontinued either by firing workers for cause or providing a 
reasonable amount of notice. All Canadian jurisdictions have minimum mandatory notice 
provisions for permanent layoffs in their employment standards laws. Most jurisdictions also 
require greater notice for mass terminations and plant shutdowns. Jurisdictions with mass layoff 
provisions also often require the employer to establish and finance a workforce adjustment 
committee, with employee representation, to develop an adjustment program for displaced 
workers and to help workers to find new job opportunities. Severance pay is also required in 
some jurisdictions.   
 
A limited amount of empirical evidence is available on the impacts of Canadian employment 
protection and advance notice provisions. Studies by Jones and Kuhn (1995) and Friesen (1997) 
conclude that advance warning of mass layoffs and plant shutdowns can have positive benefits. 
However, the impacts appear to accrue primarily for those who are capable of finding a new job 
quickly. For these workers, what would, in the absence of advance warning laws, be a short 
unemployment spell is instead replaced by an even shorter unemployment spell or an immediate 
job switch. For those who, in the absence of advance warning laws, are expected to have long 
unemployment durations, the presence of advance notice appears to have little effect (Jones and 
Kuhn 1995). There is also no Canadian evidence that advance warning reduces the earnings loss 
associated with lower wages in the post-displacement job compared to the previous job.  
   13 
Ex post adjustment assistance policies include a variety of interventions designed to help 
displaced workers cope with the trauma of losing one’s job and the associated reduced income 
and, importantly, to find suitable employment as rapidly as possible. These “active labour market 
policies” range from brief and inexpensive interventions like job search assistance to more 
intensive interventions such as retraining or assistance with relocating to regions with greater 
employment opportunities. Although Canadian evidence on the impacts of active labour market 




best evidence comes from the United States, which has a strong commitment to undertaking 
rigorous evaluations of labour market programs. The U.S. experience suggests that active labour 
market policies focused on displaced workers have a better track record than those for 
disadvantaged workers (U.S. Department of Labor 1995; LaLonde 1995). Displaced workers, 
especially those that have considerable tenure in the pre-displacement job, often require relatively 
intensive interventions such as retraining or mobility assistance. Although training programs for 
disadvantaged adults have a mixed and generally unimpressive record, Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (2005) present evidence that community college programs for retraining displaced 
workers can have positive impacts. This study found that the equivalent of one year of 
community college course work raises earnings of male displaced workers by 9% and female 
displaced workers by 13%. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (2005) also concluded that the type 
of training matters: estimated impacts were larger for those taking more quantitative vocational 
and academic courses. Eberts (2005) provides a useful review of the U.S. experience with 
programs and services for displaced workers, including an assessment of what has been learned 
from recent innovations in publicly-provided programs and services.   
The Canadian experience with adjustment assistance policies is reviewed in the report of the 
panel on older workers (Expert Panel on Older Workers 2008).  Canadian adjustment assistance 
policies have typically been limited in their duration and have focused on specific groups of 
workers or specific industries (e.g. Program for Older Worker Adjustment (POWA), The Atlantic 
Groundfish Strategy (TAGS), Pacific Fisheries Adjustment and Restructuring Program (PFAR)). 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Department of Labor (1995), Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and OECD (2006) for surveys of the 
international evidence.   14 
Evaluations of these programs (which are generally of poor quality) are not encouraging: results 
range from disappointing to dismal.  
 
Canada should improve both the design of its programs for displaced workers and the manner by 
which the impacts of these programs are evaluated. The EI program forms the core of adjustment 
assistance and improvements should begin there. As noted previously, a major flaw in the current 
EI program is that it does not provide benefits that reflect the cost of job loss. Long tenure 
displaced workers, who lose the most from permanent job loss, are not treated any differently 
than displaced workers who have been employed for brief periods of time. The Expert Panel on 
Older Workers recommended enhanced benefits for displaced workers with substantial prior 
work experience and limited prior EI receipt. As guidance they suggested that enhanced benefits 
be available to displaced workers who had been employed for at least ten years and had not 
received EI benefits during the previous five years. Enhanced benefits could take the form of 
higher benefit levels, longer benefit durations, or access to funds for training or mobility 
assistance. By aligning benefits more closely with magnitude of loss, this change would improve 
the social insurance dimension of Canada’s EI program. 
 
Design of this enhanced benefits feature requires careful assessment in order to ensure that the 
social benefits arising from improved insurance are maximized while the social costs resulting 
from any adverse side effects are minimized. Some lessons can be drawn from the European 
experience. Many European countries have unemployment insurance (UI) benefits and durations 
that depend on prior work experience (OECD 2007). For example, in Austria, those with less 
than 3 years of prior work experience (possibly with several employers) are entitled to 20 weeks 
of benefits, whereas those with 3 or more years of previous work experience are entitled to 30 
weeks of benefits. In addition, employers that permanently lay off workers with 3 or more years 
of job tenure with that firm are required to make severance payments that equal approximately 
two months salary. By exploiting these sharp discontinuities at 3 years of previous work 
experience and 3 years of tenure with the employer, Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) obtain 
convincing evidence that these features have noteworthy effects on the duration of 
unemployment following displacement. In particular, entitlement to 30 weeks of benefits reduces 
the job finding rate by 5% to 9% compared to workers displaced with less than 3 years of   15 
previous work experience. Similarly, the severance payment associated with reaching the three 
year job tenure threshold reduces the job finding rate by 8% to 12%. Interestingly, they also find 
that longer unemployment spells do not result in improved matches in the subsequent job, using 
both wages and the duration of the re-employment job as measures of job match quality. Thus 
enhanced EI benefits for long tenure displaced workers may have some adverse side effects, and 
the social costs of any such effects needs to be balanced against the social benefits from 
improved insurance against the risk of permanent job loss. 
 
Enhanced EI benefits for long tenure displaced workers may improve the insurance value of the 
EI program by reducing the income loss during the post-displacement unemployment spell. 
However, enhanced EI benefits do not help insure against the most significant income loss 
associated with job loss among long tenure workers – the lower earnings in the post-displacement 
job compared to the pre-displacement job. As discussed previously, these reduced earnings 
continue for many years after permanent job loss, and are particularly pronounced for workers 
with substantial tenure in their previous job. In order to address this source of income loss, some 
scholars (e.g. Kletzer and Rosen 2006; Kling 2006; LaLonde 2007) have recommended wage 
(loss) insurance.  Such wage loss insurance would supplement the employment income of the 
displaced worker in the post-displacement job. An example of wage (loss) insurance would be an 
earnings supplement for up to 3 years in post-displacement job, equal to 50% of difference in 
earnings between pre- and post-displacement jobs.  This type of earnings supplement recognizes 
that, for long tenure displaced workers, most of the income loss occurs after re-employment 
rather than during the post-displacement unemployment spell. In contrast, for other unemployed 
workers the income loss occurs during the unemployment spell.  
 
Wage loss insurance is an interesting policy proposal that has some attractive features. It deserves 
careful assessment. I support the recommendation of the Expert Panel on Older Workers that 
Canada undertake a rigorous demonstration project (preferably one with random assignment to 
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Conclusions 
 
Canada’s economy performed reasonably well in the post-war period, achieving high rates of 
employment growth and advances in living standards (Riddell 1999). A key contributor to this 
good performance has been a dynamic labour market that shifts workers into sectors where they 
are needed and out of declining sectors without lengthy intervening periods of unemployment. 
Canadians as a whole benefit from this reallocation process of adjusting to changing 
circumstances and opportunities. However, the costs of adjustment are unevenly distributed in the 
population.  
 
The benefits to society of adjusting to change is a theme that has been evident throughout David 
Dodge’s distinguished career, from his central role in the federal government Task Force on 
Labour Market Development in the early 1980s to his recent experience as Governor of the Bank 
of Canada. This paper deals with displaced workers, those who permanently lose their jobs 
because of changing circumstances. My analysis examines what we know about permanent job 
loss and its consequences and assesses policies designed to assist workers adversely affected by 
economic change.  
 
Despite the importance of displacement and its consequences, it is a subject that is significantly 
under-researched in Canada. The main reason for this situation is the limited data that are 
available on the extent and consequences of permanent job loss.  
 
A central finding of empirical research on displacement is that some workers suffer much more 
from losing their jobs than do others. Those who have held their jobs for an extended period of 
time experience substantial earnings losses, while those who have been employed for relatively 
brief periods of time experience small losses. Long tenure displaced workers experience earnings 
losses due to reduced income during the unemployment spell following displacement and 
because many become reemployed at significantly lower wages than those received in their pre-
displacement jobs. Our existing social insurance programs, in particular Employment Insurance, 
do not take into account these salient features of the consequences of job loss.      
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I conclude with a modest set of proposals for Canada. These are intended to address both the 
research and knowledge gaps relating to displacement and its consequences as well as the policy 
gaps in addressing this important problem. In order to address the research and knowledge gaps, 
Canada should follow the U.S. and carry out a regular Displaced Worker Survey – for example, 
one undertaken every other year and covering permanent job loss that occurred during the 
previous three years. Such a DWS could be a supplement to the monthly Labour Force Survey, 
and thus need not be expensive. The U.S. experience with a regular DWS clearly indicates the 
value of such a survey in providing timely information on the incidence of permanent job loss, 
the duration of unemployment following displacement, and the consequences for individuals and 
their families of such events. The U.S. DWS has also been an important source of data for 
research on the causes and consequences of permanent job loss. In a country like Canada, with 
significant exposure to external and internal economic shocks, the case for such a survey seems 
to be a “no-brainer.” Indeed, it is shocking that we do not devote sufficient public resources to 
gathering information on the extent and consequences of permanent job loss, especially given 
that the costs of doing so are relatively modest.  
 
There is also a strong case for enhanced EI benefits for long tenure displaced workers, and more 
generally a case for altering the parameters of the EI program to recognize that such workers 
suffer much more from job loss than do other unemployed workers. I would follow the 
recommendation of the Expert Panel and restrict the receipt or magnitude of these enhanced 
benefits to long tenure displaced workers with little or no previous EI receipt. These enhanced 
benefits should also be designed to minimize any adverse effects on the duration and intensity of 
job search. For similar reasons, the benefits and support measures provided under EI Part II 
should focus more on long tenure displaced workers – especially relatively intensive 
interventions such as retraining and mobility assistance.   
 
Finally, since most of loss from displacement occurs after reemployment, wage insurance seems 
promising. Canada should carefully assess the advantages and disadvantages of such a policy. 
The best way to do so would be to carry out a rigorous demonstration project, preferably using 
random assignment to program and control groups. 
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